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Abstract: The use of trials in the policy process is often 
presented as a move towards evidence-based policy and away 
from authority-, ideology- or faith-based policy. However, this 
paper will draw on two UK examples of unpublished policy 
trials in order to argue that – when policy is based on such 
research – it should not usually be described as evidence-based. 
Instead, the paper will argue that policies based on such 
unpublished trials are, at best, authority-based.
1 
Introduction 
There is currently considerable discussion in UK politics – and emerging from the UK 
Government – about evidence-based policy. There are real hopes that trials and data 
analysis could enable a more scientific, open and evidence-based approach to policy 
(Cabinet Office 2012b; Haynes et al. 2012) along with arguments that evidence-based 
policy requires a move beyond relying primarily on Randomised Controlled Trials 
(RCTs) (Cartright and Hardie 2012). Data analytics are hoped to offer a better and 
more ‘objective’ picture of policies’ effects on citizens, transactions and behaviour, 
while trials are hoped to offer a more effective way of testing and adapting policies 
(Amoore and de Goede 2008; Hall and Mendel 2012; Haynes et al. 2012). However, 
this paper will challenge a tendency to simply state that a trial took place and present 
the results as strong evidence that a real effect was found, which is then viewed as 
good evidence to base policy upon. Instead, it is important for the details of research 
design, methodology and analysis to be exposed to public scrutiny so that the quality 
of the work can be assessed. It is also important to consider the risk of false 
discoveries in all trials, even impeccably well-designed and conducted projects. This 
paper draws on examples of two unpublished policy trials in order to illustrate this. 
Evidence-based work has long been presented as an alternative to authority-, 
ideology- or faith-based approaches (for example Gambrill 1999; Marx and Hopper 
2005).i Advocates of Evidence-Based Medicine have made strong claims about what 
constitutes good evidence which have implications well beyond the medical field: as 
Worral (2007) argues, “[r]eal evidence-based medicine results from applying the 
universal general principles of the logic of evidence to the particular case of 
medicine”. In the context of policing, Sherman (2013: 1) argues that “[i]n contrast to 
basing decisions on theory, assumptions, tradition, or convention, an evidence-based 
approach continuously tests hypotheses with empirical research findings”. This 
approach is associated with a move away from authority-based policies which are 
justified by reference to the expertise or other characteristics of those making 
recommendations: for example, Davies et al.’s (2000: 3) definition of evidence in the 
context of evidence-based policy “largely excludes evidence presented in forms such 
as expert judgement”.ii For Gerber and Green (2012: 8) experiments are fair in part 
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insofar as they “involve transparent, reproducible procedures”: ideas of openness are a 
key aspect of work around evidence, trials and policy. 
RCTs are often presented as the primary or best a way of doing evidence-based 
policy: for example, Torgerson and Torgerson (2008: 1) argue that “[t]he ‘gold-
standard’ research methods for addressing the ‘what works?’ question in ‘evidence-
informed’ policy-making and practice is the…RCT.” For Gerber and Green (2012: 7), 
“[i]n the contentious world of causal claims, randomized experimentation represents 
an evenhanded method for assessing what works.” However, this paper will question 
some assumptions around this. While there are broader questions about whether 
randomised controlled trials in general can offer a ‘gold standard’ for research 
(summarised in Worral’s (2007) discussion of evidence-based medicine) or policy 
(see Cartright and Hardie 2012) this paper will focus on what happens when 
unpublished trials are used in policy and on the type of evidence that these trials can 
provide. 
Cartwright (2013) accepts that trials can be a good way of showing that a certain 
policy works “there”, but Cartwright and Hardie (2012: ix) are doubtful of whether 
policy trials allow a move from knowing that “a policy worked there, where the trial 
was carried out, in that population” to conclusions about what will work more 
broadly. This paper, though, will draw on work around evidence-informed policy and 
evidence-based medicine to consider a preceding question: how reliably some policy 
trials establish that a certain policy even works ‘there’. The paper will use its two 
cases to argue that trials without adequate, timely publication and scrutiny leave one 
relying on the authority or eminence of those involved in running the trials; such trials 
might, at best, allow a form of authority-based rather than evidence-based policy. 
Background: positive policy trial findings have a substantial chance of being 
wrong 
Torgerson and Torgerson (2008:1) begin their book on Designing Randomised Trials 
by noting that a “key reason for undertaking any research is to increase certainty in an 
uncertain world”. However, it is also important to emphasise that an increasing 
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certainty does not equate to total certainty: even well-designed randomised trials run 
the risk of being wrong. As Ioannidis (2005) demonstrates, a significant number of 
positive findings in scientific trials are wrong; he argues that, in scientific research, 
“most current published research findings are false”. For Ioannidis (2005): 
 
the high rate of nonreplication (lack of confirmation) of research discoveries is 
a consequence of the convenient, yet ill-founded strategy of claiming 
conclusive research findings solely on the basis of a single study assessed by 
formal statistical significance, typically for a p-value less than 0.05.  
 
More recently, Colquhoun (2014) demonstrates that – where p=0.05 is taken as the 
threshold for statistical significance – one would expect significantly more than 5% of 
positive statistically significant trial findings to be false discoveries. While well-
designed research might reduce this risk of false discoveries, it will not be eliminated. 
Statistically significant results from well-designed trials therefore still include a risk 
of false discoveries, and this can be much higher for smaller and/or lower-quality 
trials. 
However, as discussed below, policy trials may be accepted as robust evidence with 
minimal public scrutiny and no significant discussion of questions around the risk of 
false discoveries.iii In medicine, there are criticisms of a tendency to adopt a 
“fetishisation of randomisation as scientific method rather than statistical technique” 
(May et al. 2005). In the case of some policy trials, the fact a (perhaps 
problematically) randomised trial has taken place can take priority over broader 
methodological and statistical issues. If what is presented as evidence-based policy is 
based on false discoveries from inadequately-scrutinised trials then this is a long way 
from the intentions of those advocating evidence-based or evidence-informed 
approaches. 
 
Case studies 
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This paper springs from previous research failures: I was unable to access details of 
how trials were used in two UK pieces of policy research.iv These two cases are 
unlikely to be representative of UK policy trials more broadly. However, focussing on 
two problematic but relatively high-impact cases is sufficient for the paper to 
demonstrate that particular risks can be associated with such trials. 
This article will consider Behavioural Insights Team research where, despite large 
reported effects, there was not a timely publication of the detail of the research’s 
methodology and analysis; it therefore could not be publicly assessed when results 
were announced (see Cabinet Office 2012a). The article will also discuss a Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) trial on using credit referencing data to 
challenge fraud and error in the tax credit system (see Ross 2011). In the case of this 
trial, the information which has been released raises serious questions about the 
quality of this research. In both cases, the Government’s refusal to share information 
about the trials’ methodology and analysis in a timely way made it impossible for 
external scholars to critically assess or replicate the studies, and therefore to confirm 
or refute their validity.v While I attempted to make this information public via 
Freedom of Information (FOI) requests, this was unsuccessful. The known flaws of 
the HMRC trial and opacity of both cases raise questions about government trials and, 
more generally, about evidence-based policy initiatives and the scientific-sounding 
claims on which they rely. 
 
Behavioural Insights Team: increasing tax repayments 
The Behavioural Insights Team, previously part of the Cabinet Office, has worked on 
how RCTs might guide public policy.vi When researching how to get people to pay 
tax more promptly they reported finding ways to increase tax repayments by 15% 
(Cabinet Office 2012a). This sprung from three trials where, in the first RCT, “a range 
of different messages [some incorporating social norms] were tested in letters sent to 
140,000 taxpayers...there was a 15 percentage point increase from the old-style 
control letter which contained no social norm and the localised social norm letters”. A 
second RCT contacted 1,400 late payers with letters that “sought to test the 
effectiveness of a localised norms message in three larger localities” and a “third RCT 
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was conducted on 108,000 self assessment debts, worth £290 million. This trial tested 
a control letter against five other letters to examine the effectiveness of messages 
highlighting the impact of paying tax on public services in terms of gains or losses, as 
well as generic and ‘injunctive’ norms” (Cabinet Office 2014: 22-4). The first RCT 
reported a 15% increase in responses “from the old-style control letter which 
contained no social norm and the localised social norm letters” while preliminary 
results from the second trial are reported as showing that “payment rates rose from 
38.7% to 45.5%” (Ibid). For the third RCT, the Cabinet Office reported that 
“[p]rovisional results suggest that a social norm message is much more effective if it 
contrasts the recipient’s behaviour with the norm” (Ibid). 
The Behavioural Insights Team argue strongly for publication of policy trials: 
“[w]hen any RCT of a policy is completed it is good practice to publish the findings, 
with full information about the methods of the trial so that others can assess whether it 
was a ‘fair test’ of the intervention. It is also important to include a full description of 
the intervention and the participants…Following the CONSORT statement will 
ensure the key parts of the trial and the interventions are sufficiently accurately 
described” (Haynes et al. 2012: 31; see also Schulz et al. 2010).  However, the 
Behavioural Insights Team’s initial reporting of these aforementioned three trials was 
very brief: excluding one box and two figures, they are covered in 701 words (Cabinet 
Office 2012a: 22-4). There is limited detail about methodology: for example, how 
sampling was carried out or the precise changes made to test conditions. There is also 
a lack of detail on the types of analyses carried out. These write-ups neither meet nor 
aim to meet CONSORT’s influential standards for reporting. For example, they do not 
meet CONSORT’s call for details of: “Statistical methods used to compare groups for 
primary…outcome(s)…Methods for additional analyses, such as subgroup analyses 
and adjusted analyses” (Schulz et al. 2010: 699). A FOI request intended to obtain 
more detail about this research published was refused, with the Cabinet Office (at 
internal review) referring to planned future publications, including publications in 
academic journals, as a justification for the delay (What Do They Know 2013).  
In 2014 (more than 2 years after the Behavioural Insights Team announced the results 
discussed above) Hallsworth et al. (2014) published a National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) Working Paper.vii The field experiments that Hallsworth et al. 
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(2014) outline seem to include at least part of the research that the Cabinet Office 
(2012a: 22-4) has reported but (despite contacting the Behavioural Insights Team) I 
was unable, at that time, to get clarification of how this related to the original 
research.  
The Behavioural Insights Team made significant claims for what some of its research 
found, without publishing the information needed to critically assess these claims in a 
timely fashion. This is despite a Behavioural Insights Team publication arguing that 
publishing trial protocols before the trials start, “so that people can offer criticisms or 
improvements before the trial is running”, is desirable (Haynes et al. 2012: 31). In this 
instance, though, the policy of methodology being available in advance was not 
achieved in practice (though the Behavioural Insights Team are preparing to publish 
full methods in journal articlesviii) (Hallsworth 2016).ix The fact delays in journal 
publication are (as Hallsworth (2016) notes) common and can be rather long means 
that, particularly once results have been publicised, it is problematic to withhold 
information based on such planned publications. 
When the opportunity for timely public review and replication of work is removed 
without good reason, due to delayed publication, it is not appropriate to class policy 
based on this work as evidence-based.x While there is internal scrutiny of government 
research, publication allows important additional scrutiny and input (see Haynes et al. 
2012: 31). Without publication, the RCT evidence in question only has value insofar 
as one trusts the researchers and internal scrutiny processes involved, based on little 
information about how the research has been conducted. However skilled the 
researchers and internal reviewers are, no research is perfect and even the best 
researchers make mistakes. We are therefore left with something much closer to an 
old-fashioned reliance on expertise or eminence: one relies on the authority of the 
researchers and others involved in the project. It would therefore be better to call 
policy based on such work authority-based (due to this reliance on authority) rather 
than evidence-based. 
 
HMRC: credit referencing data, tax credits, fraud and error 
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HMRC has sought to draw on Experian credit referencing data in order to deal with – 
and reduce losses from – fraudulent and erroneous claims for tax credits. A FOI 
response from HMRC states that they began their trial with a sample of 20,000 cases 
“identified using internal HMRC ‘risk rules’ that suggested there may be another 
adult living at the same address as the claimant.” Subsequently, a group of 
“600…cases [that] were taken from those graded as ‘high risk’…and 150 from those 
graded as ‘medium risk’” was selected. The use of credit referencing data was trialled 
on this group. 
This use of credit referencing data was supported in a Telegraph article by the 
argument that “figures showed that £5.2 billion was lost to fraudulent benefit claims 
and administrative errors…A trial has already saved £16 million after payments often 
exceeding £40,000 were stopped” (Ross 2011). Government agencies thus hope that 
actions can be driven by what can be inferred about people by drawing on relevant 
data (see Amoore 2011). The same Telegraph article confidently offers quantitative 
predictions of future savings: “The contract is expected to save [HMRC], which 
administers the tax credits system, £700 million, while the Department for Work and 
Pensions aims to avoid £100 million in potential losses through the overpayments” 
(Ross 2011). Such quantitative claims are attractive: as Porter (1995: 74) observes, 
“Strict quantification, through measurement, counting and calculation, is one of the 
most credible categories for rendering nature or society objective.” 
This trial has not been published so FOI requests were used to try to access 
information regarding this trial. I had limited success, and the information which has 
been made available raises serious questions about the trial’s quality. 
 
Withheld information 
The public reporting of this trial – in a fairly brief Telegraph article – offers little 
detail: the article simply stated that a “trial has already saved £16 million after 
payments often exceeding £40,000 were stopped. Claimants were found to have been 
wrongly registering as single while living with partners who had jobs or other 
income” (Ross 2011). It seems the Telegraph was (unsurprisingly) not seeking to 
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provide a CONSORT compliant article and its reporting does not meet CONSORT 
standards: for example, not adequately disclosing any pre-specified outcomes, 
statistical methods, summary results for each outcome, interpretation, etc. 
The methodology used in this trial and the details of data analysis are not available for 
public scrutiny. HMRC responded to an FOI request for this by withholding this 
information, saying that “we believe that the requested information could be used by 
opportunistic individuals to make claims to which they are not entitled.” However, it 
is hard to see how details of some fairly conventional aspects of a research project 
(for example, any statistical significance tests which have been conducted) could 
plausibly have assisted inappropriate tax credit claims. Given this nondisclosure, it 
appears that what Roberts (2006: 49) describes as a “bureaucratic interest in keeping 
secrets…deeply entrenched in bureaucratic routine” is active here. 
 
Problematic reporting and methodology 
As Gerber and Green (2012: 37) argue, if we cannot be certain that allocation 
procedures were robust there is a risk of selection bias; it is not clear if or how this 
was mitigated here. Different FOI responses from HMRC discuss a ‘low risk’ group, 
a ‘medium risk’ group and a ‘low/medium risk’ group as if the three terms refer to the 
same group (HMRC later stated that the ‘low risk’ group actually included households 
rated as both ‘low’ and ‘medium’ risk). HMRC did not detail how risk groups were 
defined or selected, and use the term ‘Control Group’ in the way that researchers 
would usually use the term ‘Intervention Group’. 
HMRC stated that this trial was “assessing the merits of using Credit Reference 
Agencies [and] we set up the control group of 750 suspicious cases to contrast the 
difference between the results achieved by Credit Reference Agency (CRA) data 
match exercises using a revised process against Business as Usual (BAU) Undeclared 
Partner (UP) processes.” Table 1 was offered in response to an FOI request as 
showing “some of the key highlights”. 
Table 1 here 
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HMRC chose to select a proportion of different risk groups for the trial: stating that 
“samples of 150 low/medium risk and 600 high risk cases were selected from the 
highest award value cases…Whether the sample of high-risk cases is representative of 
the UK population is moot, it was representative of HMRC’s focus when we scaled 
up the activity”. It is plausible that this approach would allow predictions of the future 
efficacy of using credit referencing data but this depends, for example, on whether the 
cases in the ‘control group’ are likely to be similar to future cases where credit 
referencing data are used. 
The results in Table 1 are striking: it seems that these newer processes have very 
substantial effects and/or the Business As Usual and Credit Reference Information 
groups are rather different.xi Without knowing about details of 
randomisation/selection, though, it is impossible to judge which of these is more 
likely. While Torgerson and Torgerson (2008: 43) argue that “[r]andomisation gives 
us the best method of ensuring that the variance that we do not know about or cannot 
measure will be balanced between the groups”, one cannot tell whether randomisation 
was used to achieve this with this trial: the trial’s results may just show differences 
between the groups of people in the trial. 
If one bases policy on this work one is therefore left, at best, with authority-based 
policy: it is only due to trust in the authority of those doing the work, and HMRC’s 
internal scrutiny processes, that this might be viewed as an adequate evidence base for 
policy. However, given the concerns raised above about this HMRC work, it is hard 
to have confidence in the quality of the aspects of this work which have not been 
made public and one might therefore question this authority. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has outlined two cases where claims around data analysis and trials have 
served to make Government policy appear more scientific or evidence-based. This 
strategy was relatively successful: HMRC’s analysis and use of credit referencing 
data was presented as a success based in part on reported trial results and, to the best 
of my knowledge, this paper is the first published attempt at a more critical 
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assessment of the quality of this work.xii The Behavioural Insights Team’s work has 
also attracted considerable positive publicity. 
This paper has raised questions about the lack of timely published information about 
some of the Behavioural Insights Team’s work and about problems with and the lack 
of published information about an HMRC trial. Without the timely public reporting of 
more detail about the work which has been done, a reliance on the Behavioural 
Insights Team work discussed above was to a significant extent a reliance on the 
team’s authority. The HMRC trial discussed above is, as shown by what has been 
released, problematic in a number of ways: the methodology and analysis are not 
available for public scrutiny, and the information which has been released should 
leave raise concerns. Clearly, the initial reporting of these trials falls far short of 
expectations of good practice as outlined, for example, in CONSORT guidelines. 
An increased focus on evidence use in policy is welcome, and will hopefully lead to 
better use of relevant evidence. However, without the opportunity for more detailed 
analysis of and engagement with government trials, policy based on such trials should 
not generally be called evidence-based. In many cases, well-designed trials will 
provide very useful evidence. However, simply reporting that ‘trials show’ is of 
limited value without publication and critical assessment of these trials and other 
relevant evidence. As noted above, even with well-designed trials there is a real risk 
that positive findings might be a false discovery. In the cases discussed above it was 
not possible to conclude, based on what was published when trial findings were 
publicised, that these findings accurately reflect what happened there. Instead, one 
was – at best – relying on the authority of experts: relying on their reported findings 
based on a trust in their work rather than a robust assessment of this work and 
evidence. One might, if confident in the authority of these experts, be left at best with 
a relatively conventional type of authority-based policy. Policy based simply on an 
uncritical belief that trials show an intervention works or does not work – without 
adequate public assessment of or publication of these trials – should not be described 
as evidence-based. 
Moreover, a reliance on poor quality unpublished policy trials may offer a particularly 
undesirable type of authority-based policy: where the trust is placed in the authority of 
numbers rather than the expertise of individuals. As Porter (1995) observes, it is 
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tempting to place trust in numbers as if the very use or presence of these numbers 
indicates objectivity. Daston and Galison (1992: 122) argue that quantification is part 
of the “ethos of restraint” and “morality” associated with objectivity. As noted above, 
May et al. (2005) warn of a fetishisation of randomisation in research. Rather than 
being a foundation for evidence-based policy, or even providing any reliable expert 
authority, such a trust in the mere fact that a trial has taken place could be more 
analogous to the way that many gamblers develop ‘systems’ for counting the results 
in games of chance such as roulette in the belief that this increases the odds of 
winning: a trust in numbers and the quantifiable can persist even if there is no good 
reason to expect these numbers to help predict future events. In such cases, trust in 
numbers involves sacrificing the (admittedly limited) benefits of more conventional 
authority-based policy, which relies on human expertise; instead, policy is based upon 
the authority of numbers and quantification, even when these are unreliable. 
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i This links with the history of evidence-based medicine which, once again, has long been presented as 
an alternative to authority-based or eminence-based medicine. 
ii Likewise, an evidence-based approach will be a move away from policies which – as Marx and 
Hopper (2005) describe – are based on religious beliefs. 
iii Even where there is discussion of the risk of false discoveries and the benefits of replication, this may 
be limited. For example, the US Department of Education’s (2003:8) “user-friendly guide” to evidence 
for educational practices appears to assume that where p=0.05 there is “only a 1 in 20 probability that 
the difference could have occurred by chance if the intervention’s true effect is zero” and that 
“[r]equiring that an intervention be shown effective in two trials (or in two sites of one large trial) 
reduces the likelihood of such a false-positive result to 1 in 400”. This guide therefore significantly 
underestimates the potential risk of false discoveries in some ‘statistically significant’ trial findings, 
which feeds through into a problematic understanding of replication. See also Cartright (2010: 8) for 
further discussion. 
iv I was hoping to draw on these trials to consider contemporary uses of data analytics and behaviour 
modification. 
v While there may be occasional cases where work cannot be made public, this should be the exception 
and should require special justification based on particularly compelling grounds. In the UK, a refusal 
to release information on research without compelling reasons conflicts with the government’s 
argument that “Open government provides an essential foundation for economic, social and political 
progress, by strengthening the transparency of institutions…This transparency and accountability helps 
to ensure that resources are used effectively and that government, business and civil society operate in 
the public interest” (aCabinet Office 2013).  While an ‘open’ government may still need to keep some 
information confidential for reasons of, for example, crime prevention it seems implausible that this 
would be the case with all the information that has been kept private in the examples discussed below. 
vi More recently, the team has been turned into a social purpose company: owned by its employees, the 
UK government and the National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts. See 
http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/about-us for details 
vii Hallsworth (2014) also cites this NBER working paper in a journal article on ‘The use of field 
experiments to increase tax compliance’. However, this journal article does not provide additional 
detail on how these trials were carried out. See, additionally, Hallsworth et al. (2015) for a second 
NBER paper based on this work. 
viii One might also note that the Behavioural Insights Team have now moved towards pre-registering 
trials (see for example Chadborn 2014), while producing an impressive number of academic 
publications (Behavioural Insights Team 2016). 
ix Sense About Science helpfully put me in touch with Hallsworth and Sanders at Behavioural Insights 
team in 2016, following my participation in Sense About Science’s inquiry into non-publication of 
government research. 
x Hallsworth (2016) points out that a NBER paper (Hallsworth et al. 2014) actually does offer a 
replication of research the Cabinet Office (2012a). This is an impressive aspect of this research. 
Hallsworth and Sanders (2016) also report that these trials achieved p-values which were very much 
lower than 0.05 and that this should indicate a lower risk of false discoveries; additionally, Hallsworth 
(2016) notes the very large sample size in this research. However, the limited initial publication of this 
research (Cabinet Office 2012a) served to make it much harder to recognise these positive features of 
the research. A more open and timely approach to publication would have meant the research could 
have been assessed more effectively – which would include evaluating its strengths. 
xi The Business as Usual Information group generated an average yield of £228 per letter sent (142,470 
letters generated a total yield of £32,489,419), while the average across the whole Control Group was 
£2182 per case (£1,496,164 from just 600 letters); even the 150 cases categorised as Low Risk in the 
Control Group yielded an average of over £200 per case. 
xii There has, though, been some invaluable analysis of some of the harms done and concerns raised by 
the use of credit referencing data by Advice NI (2013) and a helpful briefing note from Turn2Us 
(2012). 
 Business As 
Usual 
Information 
Credit 
Reference 
Information 
Control Group 
Low/Medium 
Risk Categoriesi 
Credit 
Reference 
Information 
Control Group 
High Risk 
Categories 
Letters Issued to 
customers 
142,470 150 600 
Response Rate 34.98% 51.33% 92% 
% of cases amended 
following customer 
contact 
27.50% 14.3% 42.17% 
*Yield [Losses 
prevented through 
intervention] 
£32,489,419 £31,534 £1,496,164 
**YPYC [Yield per 
yielding cases] 
£2,371 £2,867 £5,914 
Table 1 
 
i HMRC originally described this as a ‘Low Risk’ group.  However, a subsequent response indicates that this 
group includes both low and medium risk categories; I have therefore amended the label of this table column. 
                                                 
